CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 June 1989, at 10 a.m..

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 510th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference continues today its consideration of items 1 and 2 on its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, Canada, the German Democratic Republic and Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to see you in the chair of our Conference - the representative of a friendly country with which Yugoslavia maintains relations of close co-operation. The more so because it is well known that you have devoted all your proven abilities to the cause of disarmament. The prominent award you have been granted represents well-deserved recognition of your personal endeavours and contribution.

I wish also to congratulate your predecessors, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya and Ambassador Yamada of Japan, for their successful guidance of the Conference.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin my best wishes for success in his new assignment. I would like to congratulate Minister Batsanov on his appointment as head of the Soviet delegation to the Conference, and assure him of the co-operation of my delegation. Let me also say to our dear colleagues who are going to leave us soon - distinguished Ambassadors Mario Cámpora, Aldo Pugliese and Nihal Rodrigo - how privileged I felt to enjoy their friendship and co-operation and how grateful my delegation is for their valuable contribution to the Conference. I wish them all the best in their important new assignments.

We are witnessing a series of important changes in international relations in general, as well as an unprecedented broadening in both the quantity and the quality of disarmament negotiations. There has been a steady increase in significant comprehensive and specific initiatives, and a considerable convergence of views between negotiating parties has emerged. I would like to underline the particular importance of the rapprochement of disarmament proposals on conventional disarmament in Europe, the most heavily armed continent, including the announced negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. These positive developments at the bilateral and regional European level are in sharp contrast and even contradiction with the slowing down, if not stagnation of the multilateral disarmament negotiations that we are going through. They would appear to have been placed under a kind of moratorium. The situation with regard to many items on the agenda of our Conference confirms this judgement.

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This contrast requires a serious analysis of all the factors that determine it. Multilateral disarmament does not mean - or, at least does not exclusively mean - one specific negotiating table. Rather, it should be regarded as an expression of the need to promote a sort of global thinking, the establishment of a new concept of security as a common endeavour, and maximization of the capacity of the international community to cope with new problems. In short - the multilateral approach is needed to advance the idea of universal adherence to the existing treaties and to keep the extremely complex vehicle of the international system going. The multilateral démarche is not an abstract democracy but rather an expression of the new emerging reality that disarmament problems have to be addressed and solved at the universal level.

One might offer several possible explanations of the gap between the activation of bilateral and inter-alliance negotiations on the one hand and the slowing down of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament on the other. I would like to suggest that if these conditions were to persist they could, in the final analysis, erode the consistency and even the credibility of disarmament negotiations in other fields. Having said that, I do not wish to imply that there is inherently any contradiction among the multilateral, bilateral and regional negotiations, but rather that they should form a part of the same process. At the same time it becomes more difficult to explain the different dynamics and to interpret the contradiction between them.

The outcome of the first part of this year's session left much to wish for. There is no doubt that no one could easily be satisfied with it. It would indeed be very difficult to explain to world public opinion why the Conference did not achieve more. If in the past it was possible to attribute the reluctance to negotiate to the existence of an unfavourable international environment, the same argument does not hold now that serious reconsideration of former concepts in East-West relations and of security issues is taking place and is having a positive impact on the international climate as a whole. We must therefore critically review our work and strive during the next two and a half months to take serious steps forward, at least on the three most important items - a nuclear test ban, the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons and the prevention of an an arms race in outer space.

After years of stalemate, we believe that there is now a real opportunity for progress on an NTB, an item recognized by an overwhelming number of States as having the highest priority, above any other on the disarmament agenda. Indeed, for decades now a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests has been the subject of persistent demands by the great majority of the international community, as is evident from a number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the documents of ministerial and summit meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, and other meetings at governmental or non-governmental levels. An NTB is also an international legal obligation under certain multilateral treaties, namely the non-proliferation Treaty and the partial test-ban Treaty. The initiative sponsored by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia to amend the PTBT and achieve a comprehensive test ban has so far gained the support of more than 40 States parties. The initiative does not preclude the CD from performing its legitimate role in dealing with that issue. An NTB represents a test of the durability and credibility of the whole non-proliferation régime.

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This Conference has, however, been prevented from negotiating on the item. The reasons and justifications offered are, in our view, not valid. Nuclear disarmament has, after all, begun with the implementation of the INF Treaty, and it would be normal to expect a more active role on the part of the CD in the search for ways and means to start concrete substantial work, that should at the same time be placed in the context of the fourth NPT review conference.

More than a year ago, the Group of 21 presented a draft mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and on the draft mandate presented at the previous session of the CD by the spnsors of the General Assembly resolution. This draft mandate is supported by the great majority of CD members since it represents a rational and yet a broad basis for a start of serious consideration of the item. Consequently we believe it would be appropriate once again to try to find a way to secure the acceptance of this draft mandate. But for my delegation even the draft mandate presented by the delegation of Czechoslovakia (CD/863) is acceptable. We are convinced that the importance of affirming the role of the CD on nuclear issues should prevail over formal considerations. It is no time to hesitate, but rather to take positive and effective action. We fully appreciate the dedicated and creative consultations carried out by Ambassador Yamada aimed at finding a common basis for agreement.

The next priority item - the universal and comprehensive prohibition of chemeical weapons - represents a historic challenge for the Conference and for the multilateral approach to disarmament. It is not only the negotiating capacity of the Conference that is at stake here, but also the credibility of the repeated declarations of political commitment. The declaration adopted by the Paris Conference was a welcome expression of an universal political consensus on the need to conclude the convention on chemical weapons as soon as possible. Any hesitation now would have a serious impact not only on the work of the Conference but on the dynamics of disarmament as a whole.

The Conference has already done considerable work on a number of complex conceptual and technical issues. While mindful of the differences on various substantive aspects, I nevertheless believe that the convention is within our reach and that the degree of agreement in principle is greater than it may seem at first sight. Ambassador Morel continues to inject new energy into the work of the chemical weapons Committee. However, it is our impression that the Ad hoc Committee has not yet tackled thoroughly the substance of certain key problems.

I wish to address only some of them. First of all, we should abandon any ambition that the convention should cover every single detail, any possible event or situation. We would never reach our goal in that way. The demands for strict control of the production of chemicals, even in the smallest facilities, and the overplaying of the importance of protecting commercial secrets, fall into this category. By adopting a more rational and realistic approach to these two questions we could more easily come to satisfactory solutions.

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The system of international control and verification should be rational - i.e. cost-effective and efficient. We consider it fully justified to raise the question of how to control and verify facilities that would not be subject to routine or challenge inspection, bearing in mind that both of these kinds of inspection obviously have their own limitations. A number of suggestions and opinions on that question have been put forward. They offer quite a solid base for establishing a common framework acceptable to all.

The starting-point on this question must be an understanding that, once established, an international mechanism to oversee the implementation of the convention should have specific responsibility, including the capacity to take action on its own initiative and preserve its independence vis-à-vis any State party to the convention. On the other hand, the strict obligation of States parties to respect the ban on chemical weapons production fully should be verifiable through declarations in a national register, e.g. of any facility that could represent a potential risk for the convention. To this end, the international inspectorate should include these facilities too in the draft annual programme of control. A schedule for inspections might also be based on the quota system, leaving the final choice of facilities and dates to be decided upon by the international inspectorate. The international inspectorate could take into account, for example, not only general risks for the convention, but also specific requests, suggestions and suspicions from various sources.

In spite of the different approaches still existing in the Conference with regard to the question of "challenge" inspection, we consider the largest part of this question as agreed upon, especially the part formulated in the "Ekéus paper". However, an important question in this domain remains open. The final judgement should be the responsibility of the international organs, and not only the concern of the States parties involved. Otherwise, we might ask ourselves what would be the real role of the Executive Council or of the Conference of States Parties. Of course, any politicization of the final judgement on the outcome of the inspection and its content should be avoided.

Although the question of the composition of the Executive Council has not been fully addressed so far, we consider that its solution should reflect our common concern for the universality of the convention. The first condition should be the full equality of all States parties. Membership in any organ or body of the future international mechanism should not be treated as a privilege. We are, however, aware that the composition of an international organ cannot avoid some reflection of realities and divisions in our world, and has to provide the necessary balance aimed at the elimination of political partiality and tension. This might be achieved through adequate political and regional representation. Any additional criteria or a different approach should be supported by relevant and valid reasons.

In our current negotiations on article XI, relating to economic and technological development and co-operation, some differences still exist. It seems, however, that these differences are in a way artificial. The convention in itself will represent simultaneously a result and an instrument of international co-operation. It will be, in itself, an incentive for co-operation in economic and technological development. In short, the

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convention will lead to fewer suspicions, less distrust and less fear. We will be turned towards each other, rather than confronting each other. In this article the convention must reflect exactly such an approach, and we believe there is, in fact, already a broad consensus on that point.

Regarding adherence to and duration of the convention, the text must explicitly provide that they will not be limited. The question of withdrawal from membership is related to this. The final solution of this question must be viewed within the framework of the justified demands for universality, or, at least, the need for the inclusion of all countries with a technological capability to produce chemical weapons. Such an approach already contains specific limitations on withdrawal from the convention.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another item on which the Conference is lagging behind the disquieting spread of militarization of outer space.

Outer space is our common place. The spread of the arms race to outer space, if continued, will have unpredictable consequences and court dangers which will be more difficult to control later. It should therefore be prevented and halted at the earliest opportunity. Otherwise, in a very short time we would face its destabilizing effects on international relations as a whole. The Conference cannot be excluded from negotiating efforts towards that end.

Furthermore, outer space is being used more and more for peaceful purposes, with the increasing participation of countries in search of a model of international co-operation. In that context, it is imperative to reorient scientific and technological achievements from military purposes to peaceful aims. The work of the Ad hoc Committee has been useful in deepening and increasing understanding of the complexity of the entire problem, in increasing awareness of a commonality of interests and the need for a multilateralization of the effort. But the Committee cannot do a little more of the same each year. It is high time, therefore, to pass on to the next stage of substantive work, which, at this moment in our view, should be focused on strengthening the present legal régime, expanding and improving it. The present legal régime is not sufficient to cope with the diversity of aspects connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It should be supplemented and enlarged.

The significant number of extremely important proposals and initiatives for further work in the Conference has been compiled through the remarkable efforts of both the present and former chairmen of the Ad hoc Committee. Work in the CD should not be seen to contradict the very important bilateral talks on the issue. The problem is universal and must be globally dealt with.

To conclude, I would like to stress that we can make up for lost time if we strive for rational use of the available time to address the substantive issues with renewed commitment and purposeful effort. The Conference, as the only multilateral negotiating body, plays a central and unique role, responsibility for which is in our own hands. We cannot avoid this responsibility by making reference, as we have in the past, to the unfavourable international situation or to an over-complexity of issues. The

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international community is knowledgeable and mature enough to differentiate between genuine commitments and real problems. In the first week of September the ninth summit meeting with heads of State and government of non-aligned countries is taking place in Belgrade. The meeting, which will gather together the greater part of the international community, will no doubt benevolently scrutinize our output and support our efforts, but also remind us of our responsibility to negotiate and reach agreements.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker is the representative of Canada, His Excellency the Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, Mr. Fred Bild, whom I would like to welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, thanking him for his interest in our work. I give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. BILD (Canada): As this is the first opportunity I have had of addressing the Conference on Disarmament, I ask for your forbearance if my remarks do not always reflect this body's day-to-day concerns. I should like, however, to provide a Canadian perspective of the course which CD has set for itself and the manner in which it is following it.

It is time we took stock of the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. It seems to me that we may be approaching a crise de crédibilité with our publics in the way disarmament issues are dealt with on an international level. No one doubts the dedication, patience and integrity of the people who study, discuss and negotiate these matters on behalf of their countries. But, in the best tradition of self-criticism, perhaps we should see whether, in the ceaseless round of discussions, meetings, deliberations and negotiations in the various multilateral forums, we are not somehow engaged in a faster and faster dance than in the process of advancing the dialectic. Instead of attempting to achieve a higher level of unity by reconciling opposites and revealing the truths of the underlying idea, it may seem to the man in the street that the dance just swirls on, frenetically. I don't wish to overtax this metaphor, but it seems somehow an appropriate way of interpreting events of the last while.

Many of the distinguished representatives present here will have shared my disappointment at the failure of last year's UNSSOD-III to achieve agreement. At what point does the failure to reach agreement at large, highly publicized meetings begin to call the effort itself into question? The paucity of results at most recent meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the wake of the disappointing outcome of UNSSOD-III, cannot help but feed the public's scepticism as to the value of these meetings.

Against this, we have witnessed the gratifying thaw in East-West relations. The super-Power relationship seems well poised to reach further accommodation in creating a framework of mutual security. Recent developments in the conventional force reduction negotiations just under way in Vienna have shown dramatically what can be achieved among sovereign States when the spirit of compromise infuses and directs disparate political wills. The CFE talks will be no MBFR. Agreement was forged in a setting where all joined in a quest for a common position from which to address the largest security

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transition since the end of the Second World War. They are embarking on a venture that seeks to supplant the military confrontation in central Europe with defensive systems restructured into few units with regulated and reduced offensive capabilities.

Admittedly, these are early days but, the commitment by the NATO countries, led by President Bush's suggestion for an accelerated timetable, to get moving in negotiations with Warsaw Pact Organization member States gives one hope that disarmament is not the preserve of only the utopian and the idealist. What we are seeing is the effort of the pragmatist to translate noble aspirations into reality. It is the pragmatist who sees the pay-off in disarmament, not just in its promised economic benefits but also in a heightened sense of security - mutual security. The relevance of these comments to the present meeting is that we are watching in Vienna an unfolding of a multilateral arms control and disarmament process which promises to refute those who argue that only in bilateral arrangements can a country work out a satisfactory security relationship with a potential adversary.

We must also recognize, however, that the quest for disarmament should not be too far in advance of what relevant political conditions can sustain. Until those conditions are dealt with, until, that is, determination is shown by all parties involved to bring their mutual understanding and political accommodation to a level where practical steps towards arms control or actual disarmament can take place, our sights must be lowered somewhat to the level of confidence-building. It is still pertinent to recall the familiar observation that one must learn to walk before one can begin to run. The achievement of the Stockholm Conference provided a salutary lesson in this regard. The accord reached in September 1986 on confidence - and security-building measures in Europe ushered in an era of greater transparency and openness between military blocs without excluding the neutral and non-aligned States of the region. In so doing, it set the stage for the conventional force reductions we all hope will be the outcome of the CFE negotiations. If these actually manage to bring about the destruction of military equipment before international observers, as proposed, we shall finally have achieved multilateral disarmament without any lessening of security. There is another aspect to the legacy of Stockholm we must not forget: it successfully incorporated short-notice challenge inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the agreement. The acceptance of such powerful verficiation measures in support of greater transparency in military activities has provided us with a practical, workable recipe for building confidence on a multilateral basis.

Verification and transparency are two subjects that have formed a central part of the Canadian Government's approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament. They are central elements in the building of confidence and consensus. It will come as no surprise, I am sure, to the distinguished representatives to this Conference that verification ranks high in our priorities. Canada has endeavoured through its Verification Research Programme to contribute in an effective way to the very foundation of modern arms control. Some of the studies we have initiated have looked at technical problems associated with various methods of verification, while others have sought to clarify the conceptual basis of verification, bearing in mind that

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much will depend on the type of arms control and disarmament to be verified. Ambassador Marchand's plenary statement last March illustrated this approach through mention of the projects we have pursued in the past and those we are currently pursuing. I shall not repeat them in detail here.

I should like, however, to add several points on verification as it pertains to multilateral arms control and disarmament. In 1985, attention was initially focused on this subject in the United Nations General Assembly through a Canadian initiative which led to the adoption by consensus of a resolution (40/152 O) which crystallized the increasing world-wide awareness of the importance of verification in facilitating the negotiating process. Since then, this awareness has grown and become more sophisticated. For example, the United Nations Disarmament Commission during 1987 and 1988 developed a set of general principles of verification. We call them "the 16 principles". The forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, after some false starts, called for a study by the Secretary-General on the role of the United Nations in verification. This led to the setting up of a group of experts from 20 countries who started their work in February this year. They paid me the honour of electing me Chairman; I in turn have pledged to them that I shall spare no effort in guiding our work to a fruitful conclusion. The Group's acceptance of the 16 principles as a foundation for its work was a positive development. As one might well expect, the exact nature of our recommendations cannot be determined at this early stage of our work. But progress so far has been good, and I remain optimistic that we shall produce a report that is technically competent, politically realistic and one which will strengthen the multilateral arms control process and the United Nations itself.

Allow me at this point to offer some thoughts on how multilateral verification and the quest for greater transparency and openness surrounding military activities can come together to build confidence. Last month, President Bush unveiled a proposal for "open skies". It would involve, as the name suggests, opening a country's national airspace to short-notice overflights by unarmed aircraft, on the basis of reciprocity. The proposal has been laid out in bilateral terms, involving the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. President Bush, however, clearly indicated that the proposal could easily be reworked to include member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the moment, "open skies" is seen as a confidence-building measure independent of any specific arms control or disarmament agreement. It seeks to improve transparency and openness in a way that is accessible to all countries. Highly sophisticated satellite technology would not be required. Nor would any information be gathered that would not be similarly available to other countries, especially in the area of most concern to all: military preparations for surprise attack and offensive action.

The merits of "open skies" are clear to the Canadian Government. When a similar kind of proposal was put forward as early as 1955 by President Eisenhower, we supported it. Indeed, we continued in following years to suggest that Canadian airspace - in particular the Canadian northern and Arctic regions - would be offered for inclusion if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on an "open skies" idea as a confidence-building measure against the threat of surprise attack. Today there are added reasons

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for supporting the proposal, not least of which is its potential use in verifying conventional forces reduction agreements. Aircraft surveillance, for instance, would make it harder to hide military movements or non-compliance with arms control agreements. There would be other advantages from the resulting transparency. I shall not rehearse them all at the moment, except for their relevance to the multilateral disarmament process. "Open skies" would, for example, allow all parties to an agreement to participate fully in arms control verification and monitoring; it would allow for continuous monitoring to prevent a rapid clandestine military build-up and to maintain confidence that a surprise attack was not being planned. The obligation to comply with the acceptance of such overflights, on a reciprocal and agreed basis, could be specifically built into the arms control or disarmament treaty eventually signed. One could even imagine that this formula might be adapted to provide needed transparency in other parts of the world subject to regional tensions.

Despite its 34-year-old vintage, I find this idea innovative in its simplicity yet appropriate to some of the multilateral verification issues we encounter in our discussions both here and at the United Nations. I urge all CD member States to give the "open skies" proposal the thoughtful and serious study it so clearly deserves at a time when transparency and verification need to be joined more intimately in disarmament forums.

With these reflections in mind, I turn briefly to the specific issues before us at the CD, starting with agenda item 4 - chemical weapons. Over the past two years, agreement has been reached on vitally important issues relating to verification, methods and timetables for CW destruction, and declarations in advance of a treaty. The next few steps - hammering out the details - will not by their very nature give the appearance of dramatic progress. But appearances cannot be a substitute for real, if slower and more arduous, headway in completing the draft convention before us. The key lies in keeping the negotiations free from artificial deadlines and from the inclination to force issues ahead of what consensus can sustain. Progress over the next session will be step-by-step and will depend on appropriate attention to detail. I commend the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, in facilitating this progress through his well-focused and practical work programme.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the 16 verification principles agreed by consensus at the UNDC constitute the corner-stone of an emerging common approach to disarmament. This consensus must be protected and nourished to allow its roots to sink deeply into the multilateral disarmament process. Naturally, these roots, as they develop, will become more intertwined and complex, but this is true of any firmly established system. We should not be dismayed at the prospect of complexity in verification. The question is how we can carry out practically and effectively that which has been agreed in principle and by all member States of the Conference.

In the modern age, arms control and disarmament have become, to the surprise of some, perhaps, increasingly reliant on short-notice, on-site inspection. The feature is found in the United States/Soviet Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, as well as in the multilateral Stockholm

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accord on confidence- and security-building measures. Both agreements have been successfully implemented and fully complied with, a result, I would argue, to a large measure attributable to the possibility of such inspections.

Allow me to amplify these remarks by applying them to the draft chemical weapons convention. I find it difficult to imagine that any future disarmament treaties can be reached without the prospect of potentially intrusive international verification. Should this be alarming or a cause for disquiet? Not at all. We should always bear in mind that no verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand. Moreover, co-operation and consensus over these details will make the intrusiveness of international on-site inspection into a means of assuring all concerned that the treaty is being fully complied with by the parties.

I have heard it suggested that in the case of the chemical weapons convention, requests for challenge inspections would generate political sensitivities and suggestions of guilt. This outlook misconstrues the objective of such inspections. They need not be regarded as provocative, but rather as confidence-inspiring. Until such time as experience and technology permit more systematic methods of inspection to carry the full load of verification, I submit that challenge inspections will be de rigueur in virtually all disarmament treaties, the chemical weapons convention being one of the more prominent. What we could be encountering is an "attitudinal" problem, a problem that can be overcome as long as we keep our eyes firmly on the following: first, an essential concern of the convention is to ensure that international inspectors have access to any facility where clandestine activities might be undertaken; second, the essential obligation is on the challenged State to demonstrate its compliance, and not on the requesting State to prove non-compliance. As we have all indicated an abiding interest in a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention, this objective in regard to verification should be fully embraced, with the obligations willingly, indeed cheerfully, shouldered. There is thus no reason to shrink back in fear. Since we have already agreed with the UNDC conclusion that the request for inspection not carry with it implications of guilt but rather be considered a normal element of verification, let us put this "attitudinal" problem behind us and move to a more practical, less anxious understanding of what challenge inspections imply.

By the same token, we should not venerate challenge inspections as the "be-all and end-all" of chemical weapons verification. Careful thought should be given to elaborating a verification régime that would avoid unnecessary recourse to the challenge provision. Indeed, we can also explore other avenues, perhaps by making challenge inspections as "routine" as possible; by keeping them as multilteral as possible in execution and reporting of findings; and by allowing as much flexibility as possible in solving compliance problems to everybody's satisfaction through other means. These other means could include, inter alia, mutually agreed bilateral measures, fact-finding "clarification visits" or other means of demonstrating clarification short of invoking the challenge provisions. I have every confidence that, with ingenuity and perseverance, the Ad hoc Committee will find a way to accommodate the concern over intrusive on-site challenge inspection without jeopardizing the integrity of the "mandatory, short-notice" principle.

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Let me now turn to the issue of a comprehensive test ban. Ambassador Marchand outlined Canada's position in his March statement. We consider Ambassador Vejvoda's compromise proposal as the one which offers the greatest promise of a basis for consensus. We look forward to hearing from those who have remained silent in that regard. But let us again step back for a moment and survey the scene as we end the Second Disarmament Decade. Here we are, on the one hand, stalemated in reaching agreement on a mandate which would allow us to discuss the important issue of a nuclear test ban. All of us have indicated, at one time or another, either unreservedly or with qualifications, our belief that a negotiated comprehensive nuclear test ban is desirable and achievable. Realism, however, suggests that we cannot allow our expectations on a ban to outstrip what is politically feasible or technically achievable. Again, the need for candour brings us to an uncomfortable prospect: that achieving a test ban, even if it could be done overnight, may not prevent the development of nuclear explosive devices and their possible use in a future conflict, regardless of their being untested. Looking this squarely in the eye is indeed disconcerting.

We in Canada can well understand the frustration of many States at the slow progress in achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but we do not think that it is wise to try to resolve this issue through the back door, so to speak. As you all know, there is an active move afoot to amend an existing treaty - the partial test-ban treaty - to achieve a CTB. Those who favour this course should consider carefully the longer-term implications of this move for the whole multilateral disarmament process. Forcing arms control and disarmament treaties to be opened up for radical amendment is a dangerous game, especially if there is no pre-existing consensus for this among the treaty's signatories. The very future of the existing agreement may be placed in jeopardy. Even more disconcerting is the apparent readiness of at least some to tie this call for a PTBT amendment conference to the future continuation of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Any such efforts should be firmly resisted. I cannot think of a better example of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. To threaten to bring down the corner-stone of the nuclear non-proliferation régime in the quest for an amendment which, however well intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.

What we can do, however, is to remain relentless and single-minded in preparing the ground for a test ban. Until such time as the nuclear Powers are persuaded that a ban is in their security interests, pleas for negotiations will fall on stony ground. Yet this is no excuse for being unprepared when circumstances change, as I am hopeful they will. The trepidation the nuclear Powers and the rest of us will undoubtedly feel in taking tentative steps into the post-nuclear-weapon era will largely be assuaged by assurances that no one is cheating. That is why improvement and refinement of our ability to monitor adequately such a ban should remain paramount on the multilateral disarmament agenda. We need to continue energetically experimentation with, and testing of, seismic data exchanges. Only by improving the expertise and co-ordination with which seismic events can be globally monitored will a level of verification be reached that is comforting and assuring to all. Let us not be caught in a position where the nuclear Powers are ready to call a halt to their testing but the required verification instruments are not yet in place.

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The prevention of an arms race in outer space is something that we all wish to achieve. The march of technology is relentless: more and more countries are developing know-how and the means to send rockets with satellites, space probes and other scientific instruments into space. Our task is to try and assure our publics that these activities, even ones carried out under military auspices, are for purposes that contribute to, not detract from, international security. But before a start can be made in this regard, we must know what international security means as it relates to the uses of space. International security, as Ambassador Marchand has recently pointed out, implies not only the absence of weapons as such in outer space, it entails the responsibility of the two major space Powers to maintain a stable, controlled relationship between themselves on space issues. This means that all efforts to consider the relationship between international security and outer space are predicated on the enhancement of stability. It is our job to identify measures concerning the use of outer space that can be taken on a multilateral basis and through consensus, and that will enhance stability - admittedly a daunting task. That is all the more reason to ensure that the first step provides a strong building block from which further proposals can proceed.

Let me reiterate the contention already put foward by the Canadian delegation. Much more attention has to be given to the basic framework involved in the use of space. The current régime on outer space, comprising a number of international agreements and treaties, can be strengthened: we can search for agreement on the definition of key terms, clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. We could make a start, for example, in applying principles of transparency to activities in space by urging more States to sign the registration Convention and by persuading the parties to the registration Convention to agree to provide more timely and specific information on the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

As I am sure you are all aware, Canada is ready and eager to move forward on the negotiation of a treaty banning radiological weapons. We have had a draft before us for many years now. Yet any possibility of advance has been side-tracked by issues which, while important in themselves, are not, in our estimation, fundamental to reaching agreement on banning a new form of weapons of mass destruction. We need not reiterate the arguments that have brought us to this impasse: rather, let us stand back and put things once again in their proper perspective. What will this impasse do to all our other endeavours? Will it not undermine the credibility of the multilateral process?

Fortunately, radiological weapons do not at present exist. Simple logic would dictate that now is the time to prevent their future development by agreeing to a comprehensive and effective ban. To some, it may seem a hollow victory that a weapon that does not exist is being prohibited. But look at the other examples of international treaties that have sought, implicitly, if not explicitly, to cut off a potential development before it can take root. We have examples before us: The Antarctic Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty, the environmental modification treaty.

(Mr. Bild, Canada)

On a bilateral basis, the anti-ballistic missile Treaty prevents the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and their components, whether based on current or future technological principles. Many States would concur that blocking the unilateral deployment of ABM systems through this Treaty constitutes a corner-stone of nuclear arms control between the super-Powers and helps give the whole process its legitimacy. I would argue that a treaty on radiological weapons would contribute in a similar fashion to the legitimacy, as well as the credibility, of the multilateral disarmament process and should be viewed from this more positive perspective.

It strikes me that the forward strides the United States and USSR are beginning to make bilaterally in arms control and disarmament, and those which we may yet see over the next years in the multilateral process at Vienna, serve both as an encouragement to the work being done here in Geneva and as a strict reminder that the international spotlight may focus even more directly on the Conference on Disarmament as a result. We have received a taste of this kind of attention over the past year as world concern mounted over the use of chemical weapons. Similarly, international anxiety is bound to keep growing over arms build-ups in numerous regions of the world, over new types of weapons, new areas of deployment (including outer space), and over the renewed use of weapons we had long hoped would never be used again. The world will thus ask this body pointed questions and will expect it to offer meaningful results. Yet we must protect the multilateral arms control process from excessive demands, remembering the old adage that the best is often the enemy of the good. We cannot ask the arms control process to resolve all the problems, or carry all the burden of existing political differences. Let us work assiduously to allow the CD to begin achieving what in principle it ought to be able to achieve: maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of the multilateral disarmament process. We cannot let this credibility slip away.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for the statement with which he has contributed to our discussions. And now I give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): At the outset, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you upon your assumption of your high office. I do this with particular pleasure as you are representing a country with which the German Democratic Republic enjoys close and friendly relations. Your accession to the post of President of the Conference reflects the significant part Mexico is playing in the struggle for peace, disarmament and equal co-operation between States and peoples. Your accession also mirrors the personal commitment you display in the quest for arms limitation and disarmament, which is highly valued by my delegation. I have pleasant memories when I think of the time we worked together in New York in the mid-1970s, which is being continued here in Geneva. I wish you much success in the discharge of your responsible duties, and can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

A less pleasant duty is to note with regret the departure of Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, as well as Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, who, as we all know, had to accomplish a particularly responsible task at the beginning of our Conference. I wish them success in their new assignments.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is entering its second round. Notwithstanding all the complexities and contradictions of the situation, quite a few propitious developments have taken place since the spring part of this session. Yesterday, the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons were resumed, in a very welcome event. We expect them to produce concrete results in the form of 50 per cent cuts in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons. It was a few days ago that the Soviet Union and the United States again started their bilateral consultations on chemical weapons. We are convinced that they will generate a decisive impetus for concluding the negotiations on a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The proposal by the Warsaw Treaty States that separate negotiations be taken up on tactical nuclear arms in Europe lies on the table. We advocate the commencement of such talks within a reasonable period of time, with no undue delay. Linkages are not very helpful in this context. In our view, developments in the correlation of military forces and the situation in the field of nuclear disarmament necessitate the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has declared its readiness, in agreement with its allies, to withdraw all nuclear warheads from their territories by the year 1991, provided that the United States of America takes a similar step. This is, in fact, a significant approach.

The appeal made by the Warsaw Treaty States to the member States of NATO in May this year has lost nothing of its topicality. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are implementing the unilateral disarmament measures announced by them. This convincingly reaffirms their resolve not to allow any hiatus to occur in the disarmament process. It concerns a total of at least 581,300 troops, 12,751 tanks, 10,030 artillery systems, 1,010 combat aircraft and 895 armoured vehicles, as well as some tactical nuclear systems. We hope that other States will come up with similar moves.

The positive start to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe as well as on confidence- and security-building measures is encouraging in our opinion. Both sides have tabled substantive documents.

The German Democratic Republic regards the results of the NATO summit as a step in the right direction, as the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, stated only recently. We welcome the fact that the American proposals respond to the initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty for the inclusion of aircraft, helicopters and numerical strength in the reduction process and the scrapping of weapons systems to be dismantled. This attitude comes close to our striving for radical conventional disarmament. To expedite the Vienna negotiations on conventional armaments fully complies with our interests.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The summer session of the Conference is thus starting its work under favourable circumstances. Now it is incumbent upon all of us to seize the chance offered within the coming 10 weeks and render a substantial contribution towards visibly advancing the process of disarmament now under way. We should not allow the global field of disarmament, i.e. its multilateral dimension, to fall behind the requirements. The German Democratic Republic takes the view that the Conference should enter into a result-oriented dialogue and proceed to negotiations, where possible. Furthermore, current negotiations should come to a conclusion very soon. We favour translating the constructive and business-like atmosphere into concrete action.

We all know how things stand at the moment. We know about the deficiencies. But we are also cognizant of the possibilities that need to be exploited to arrive at constructive solutions regarding the pending contentious issues. Meaningful steps have, in fact, been undertaken to intensify the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I share the views on this subject expressed this morning by Ambassador Kosin. In addition, however, we feel that it is now high time to focus more attention on the outstanding essential questions. In this respect, we are thinking in particular of the following: finalizing the provisions on challenge inspections, agreeing on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities, and reaching understanding on the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council of the future Organization. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to make a distinctive contribution during the summer session.

To ensure the speediest conclusion of the convention, as agreed upon in Paris, let me also refer to the suggestion for a meeting of the Conference at foreign minister level. If it is deemed possible to reach agreement in Vienna within six months or one year, then there is all the more reason to consider that the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention constitutes a realistic goal.

The improved political conditions should enable the Conference to finally stride ahead in the field of nuclear disarmament. The proposals put forward by the USSR in 1986 and by India in 1988 on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, the working paper on nuclear disarmament presented by a group of socialist States in New York in May this year, as well as the resolutions of the General Assembly relating to this item would, in our view, be suitable projects to begin with. This is especially true of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Here lies the key to curbing the nuclear arms race and considerably restricting the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons. We believe that practical work should be centred on verification. The German Democratic Republic has submitted proposals to this end. Our delegation will continue to do so in future. The establishment of a committee on a nuclear test ban deserves our unqualified support.

And may I add another idea? Should it not be the task of the Conference to make an essential contribution to the elaboration of principles governing nuclear disarmament? In this context, we have in mind the following:

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in particular between a drastic cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the United States of America and the USSR and the halting of the build-up of nuclear armaments by other nuclear-weapon States. What would have to be taken into account in this respect is the interrelationship between the different levels of nuclear armaments - strategic, intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons;

The interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and other areas of disarmament, e.g. to reduce conventional armed forces and prevent an arms race in outer space;

Discussion of collateral measures of nuclear disarmament. They include the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign territory, security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, measures to forestall a nuclear war, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In our opinion, the overall problem of nuclear disarmament also comprises the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. At this juncture, let me point to the recently announced decision by the Soviet Union to halt the production of highly enriched uranium intended for military purposes and to decommission two more plutonium reactors.

Such conceptual problems could become topics of informal meetings of the CD's plenary. The German Democratic Republic supports the resumption of these meetings.

The demand for greater precision in terms of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is equally important. Our delegation advocates that the discussion in the outer space Committee should be conducted in a more structured and intensive manner, with experts being involved. A step-by-step approach to the factual problems seems practicable in this respect. Here we have in mind the consideration of confidence-building measures providing for the protection of outer space objects, as advanced, inter alia, by France and the Federal Republic of Germany in connection with a "code of conduct" and "rules of the road". This approach also encompasses the proposals made by socialist States and non-aligned countries concerning agreements on the prohibition of anti-satellite and other outer space weapons. We have repeatedly undertaken initiatives in this field, and will continue to develop them further.

Those are my reflections on the work of the summer session.
Mr. President, permit me to make a concluding remark. In the course of the previous debate, the issue of social orders was occasionally raised. I believe that only if we respect each other as we are, only if we stick to the mandate and subject of the Conference, if we place the main emphasis on questions which will help make headway in disarmament, will it be possible to bring about sober-minded co-operation. What we want is co-operation that is benefical to all those involved and in which everybody takes a share. We do not seek more - but we will not accept less.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): A fortunate coincidence in our calendar gives me the opportunity to make my farewell statement to this Conference on Disarmament under the presidency of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, who in July 1985 also welcomed me in his capacity as representative of Mexico. Thus, at the time when I took up my duties as representative of my country at the Conference on Disarmament, as well as when taking my leave of it, I have found myself under the auspices of the person who is to the highest degree recognized as a champion of the cause of disarmament.

Mr. President, I shall not embark on a panegyric to your qualities. World public opinion already has a very definite idea of your outstanding services for a peaceful world through disarmament. Allow me simply to express my pleasure at this fortunate circumstance which has given me the opportunity to join the Conference on Disarmament under your auspices and to take my leave of it today under your guidance.

The passage of time has brought me to the end of four years as representative of the Argentine Republic to the Conference on Disarmament. I arrived in July 1985, and I must say that in this Conference I have had the opportunity to appreciate in advance the major changes that are taking place today in international life. The question of disarmament, like no other, unequivocally reveals the intent of States in their international conduct. Security is the highest value in the life of any country, and attitudes to disarmament are telling indicators of an international trend at a given stage.

In these four years we have had the opportunity from the Conference on Disarmament to observe the gradual abandonment of the attitude of confrontation which had prevailed since the end of the Second World War, and the start of a promising stage of peaceful co-operation between the great Powers. In 1985, here in Geneva, the meeting took place between the then President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The statement issued by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev on 20 November 1985 indicated that, through the improvement in the relationship between these two major Powers, prospects were opened up for a stage of peaceful co-operation in international life. Subsequently, a series of bilateral negotiations were held here in Geneva on nuclear weapons and in Stockholm and Vienna on confidence-building measures between the two major military alliances, in addition to other summit meetings which helped to stretch out the current phase of international developments. Furthermore, the statements at the plenary meetings of this Conference which we heard from heads of Government and foreign ministers of many countries carried a clear message which reflected the international climate which was emerging, with a definite profile of détente. In particular, one could perceive in these statements an intention of solving regional conflicts in the form of a reaffirmed determination to resolve them through political means, abandoning recourse to armed confrontation.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

In these four years, the Conference on Disarmament has been an extremely valuable look-out post, which has enabled us to anticipate events and to keep the men who have political responsibilities in our country informed concerning the peaceful co-operation which prevails today in international life with the disappearance of the threat of the outbreak of the Third World War, which in the last four decades has periodically haunted the destiny of mankind.

Even though this might appear to be a concept which falls outside the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, I cannot fail to point out that the prospects for consolidation of this peaceful stage in international life inevitably correspond with the progressive strengthening of democratic institutions and the flowering of freedoms and respect for human rights. Nor can I fail to point out that, paradoxically, the dark shadow of the unjust distribution of wealth in the world continues to fall on relations among men when a vast population suffers from basic hardships whereas some sectors of mankind enjoy the privilege of abundance and opulence.

Despite this picture we have described in general terms, which prompts encouraging and well-founded hopes for world peace for the coming years, we cannot fail to express our concern at the lack of progress in the multilateral framework in which the question of disarmament is being dealt with. For many years there has been no concrete progress within the Conference on Disarmament. We recognize that intensive negotiations are taking place to conclude a convention which will ban chemical weapons once and for all, and we are certainly aware of the technical difficulties which have to be resolved. It is clear that, over and above their undeniable complexity, the technical problems will be overcome in so far as there is a real political will to conclude the convention. Strictly speaking, in sum, only these negotiations in the area of chemical weapons may be noted as a specific prospect in the multilateral field of the United Nations. But within a broader framework, and ominously, we must also note the failure of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held a year ago at United Nations Headquarters in New York. To retrieve for the United Nations the exercise of competence in the field of disarmament is an aim which should be borne in mind by member States in their immediate actions.

It is recognized by all that international life has acquired a degree of interdependence that requires from all States active participation in the management of interests shared by man on the Planet Earth which is his habitat. No one can dispute that it is legitimate for all the members of the international community to participate in decisions which have a bearing on the management of these common interests of mankind. Intercourse among nations is increasingly involved in subjects proper to big cities. International life is becoming increasingly citified because its problems are beginning to be the same as those affecting cities. There is, for instance, a real concern that all countries share in respect of common problems such as the equitable distribution of wealth in the world, the pollution of the Earth's environment in terms of the atmosphere, the seas, or the dumping of industrial wastes.

What are these subjects if not matters of municipal administration? The fact is that the world is increasingly just one big city. It is our opinion that at the present time Governments are tackling the problem of organizing

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

this international life, which is so close-knit and intricate, either through the participation of all States or, alternatively, through the unilateral self-assignment of this mission on the part of a group of major countries which by themselves and for themselves assume the role of protectors of the international common good. The question of disarmament, like many of these common concerns which we have pointed to, is of interest to all countries without exception. However, multilateral efforts to deal with it have not prospered. Nor has there seemed to be any progress in the handling of this international common good to which we have referred, on a basis of democracy and participation by all States on an equal footing. The international system must decide whether it is going to be democratic or not.

The Conference on Disarmament is an area which very clearly reflects the trends that we have developed above. All the delegates present here have a clear assessment as to the obstacles which obstruct the progress of our negotiations. Having said this, it is necessary to recognize that, in addition to the indispensable political will, our negotiations, by their very nature, require a great effort of imagination to reconcile the mosaic of diverse interests existing between different countries and regions on the five continents. In this regard, I have in mind the testimony of the great professional effort renewed daily throughout the session of the Conference on Disarmament by representatives accredited here in the search for solutions compatible with these very diverse interests.

This sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament is vital in the search for solutions to the grave problems that threaten peace. In our first statement before the United Nations General Assembly in 1985, in introducing the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament in our capacity as President, we said that none of the political trends currently at work in the world can do without this organ, as it represents a major step in the development of appropriate international arrangements for the adoption of measures to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is worth mentioning that around the negotiating table of the Conference on Disarmament the five nuclear-weapon Powers are seated. Moreover, the group of non-aligned and neutral countries has a numerical majority which is approximately in keeping with their representativeness within the international community. It should also not be forgotten that the Conference on Disarmament is the first multilateral negotiating body to have taken up the responsibility of including in its agenda the consideration of essential measures to halt the arms race. The Conference on Disarmament is important for the non-aligned and neutral countries, because those who, without being the authors, would nevertheless fall victim to the consequences of a global conflict, can make their voices heard here. It is also important for them because it secures their participation in decisions relating to their technological independence and international co-operation in this field. The active presence of the neutral and non-aligned countries at this Conference offers the possibility of working in favour of understanding and for a convergence of positions between the military alliances, not as mediators, but as independent and responsible partners.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The Conference on Disarmament is also important for the nuclear-weapon Powers and for those which have opted for membership of military alliances, as the Conference on Disarmament in its continuity offers a forum in which peace and security can be protected. As militarily significant States, the members of those alliances have a primary responsibility for preserving peace and contributing to the cessation of the arms race in all its aspects. The Conference on Disarmament, let us remember, is the sole multilateral forum that, by virtue of its nature as a negotiating body, has power to endorse the agreements of the international community as a whole in the field of disarmament.

Today, on the occasion of taking our leave, we would like to express the hope that the climate of international détente will be exploited through the conclusion of disarmament agreements of more ambitious scope which will help to consolidate peace and international security once and for all, both in the relation between the major Powers and wherever, even today, situations generating regional tensions still exist.

Finally, I must say to my colleagues present here that it is not my intention to convey the idea that I am saying good-bye for ever. On the contrary, nothing will give me greater pleasure than to follow the work of the Conference on Disarmament closely and, if possible, renew my occasional presence here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Cámpora, the representative of Argentina, for the statement with which he has contributed to our discussions, and very particularly for his generous words addressed to the Chair. I am sure I will be expressing the feelings of all my colleagues if I say how much we will miss his presence and how pleased we were to hear of his plans to renew his occasional presence in the Conference, as he put it.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? It seems not. Consequently, I should like to inform you that after consulting the distinguished representative of Argentina and my fellow officers, we thought that the reception planned for noon today could be brought forward by a quarter of an hour, so as to start at 11.45 a.m. This would accommodate the distinguished representative of Argentina, who, as you will understand, has many urgent tasks to perform, as have some of us. Accordingly, the reception in the Salon tchèque will begin at 11.45 a.m. instead of 12 noon.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.